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Abstract: As recently pointed out by the Institute of Medicine, the existing pandemic 
  containment and mitigation models lack the dynamic decision support capabilities. We 
  present two simulation-based optimization models for developing dynamic predictive resource 
  distribution strategies for cross-regional pandemic outbreaks. In both models, the underlying 
simulation mimics the disease and population dynamics of the affected regions. The quantity-
based optimization model generates a progressive allocation of limited quantities of mitiga-
tion resources, including vaccines, antiviral, administration capacities, and social distancing 
enforcement resources. The budget-based optimization model strives instead allocating a total 
resource budget. Both models seek to minimize the impact of ongoing outbreaks and the expected 
impact of potential outbreaks. The models incorporate measures of morbidity, mortality, and 
social distancing, translated into the societal and economic costs of lost productivity and medi-
cal expenses. The models were calibrated using historic pandemic data and implemented on a 
sample outbreak in Florida, with over four million inhabitants. The quantity-based model was 
found to be inferior to the budget-based model, which was advantageous in its ability to balance 
the varying relative cost and effectiveness of individual resources. The models are intended to 
assist public health policy makers in developing effective distribution policies for mitigation 
of influenza pandemics.
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Introduction and motivation
Influenza pandemics have historically ensued enormous societal calamities amplified 
by staggering economic forfeitures. In the U.S. alone, the Spanish flu (1918, serotype 
H1N1), the Asian flu (1957, H2N2), and the Hong Kong flu (1968, H3N2) resulted in the 
death toll of more than 500,000, 70,000 and 34,000 cases, respectively.1 More recently, 
a series of scattered outbreaks of the avian-to-human transmittable H5N1 virus has been 
mapping its way through Asia, the Pacific region, Africa, the Near East, and Europe.2 
As of March 2010, the World Health Organization (WHO) has reported 287 deaths in 
486 cases, worldwide.3 At the same time, in Spring 2009, a milder human-to-human 
transmissible H1N1 virus subtype resurfaced and propagated to an ongoing global 
outbreak; as of March 2010, 213 countries have been affected with a total number of 
infections and mortalities of 419,289 and 16,455, respectively.4 Today, most experts have 
an ominous expectation that the next pandemic will be triggered by an emerging highly 
pathogenic virus, to which there is little or no pre-existing immunity in humans.5
The ability to contain and mitigate influenza pandemics depends on available 
emergency response infrastructure and resources, and at present, challenges abound. Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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Prediction of the exact emerging virus subtype remains 
a difficult task, and once it is identified, a surge production 
of sufficient vaccine quantities can take from six to nine 
months.6,7 Even if the emerged subtype has a known epide-
miology, the existing stockpiles would be limited due to high 
production and inventory costs.8,9 Also will be significantly 
constrained the supply of antiviral, immunizers and other 
healthcare providers, hospital beds and supplies, and logis-
tics. Thereby, pandemic mitigation has to be done amidst 
a limited knowledge of disease and population dynamics, 
constrained infrastructure, shortage of effective clinical 
treatments, and to-be-proven resource allocation policies. 
This challenge, faced during the recent H1N1 outbreak, has 
been acknowledged by WHO9 and echoed by the Health and 
Human Services (HHS) and the Center for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC).10,11
The existing literature on pandemic influenza (PI) model-
ing aims to address various complex aspects of the pandemic 
evolution process including: (i) underlying spatio-temporal 
structure, (ii) contact dynamics and disease transmission, (iii) 
disease progression, and (iv) development of mitigation strat-
egies. A comprehensive decision-aid model for containment 
and mitigation has to invariably consider all of the above 
aspects: it must incorporate the mechanism of disease pro-
gression, from initial infection, to the asymptomatic phase, 
manifestation of symptoms, and a final health outcome;12–14 
it must also consider the population dynamics, including 
individual susceptibility15,16 and transmissibility,12,17–19 as 
well as the behavioral factors that affect infection generation 
and disease progression;20–23 finally, it must incorporate the 
impact of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical measures, 
including vaccination, antiviral therapy, social distancing 
and travel restrictions, and use of low-cost measures, such 
as face masks and hand washing.24–27
In recent years, the models for PI containment and miti-
gation have focused on integrating therapeutical and non-
therapeutical measures in search for synergistic strategies, 
aimed at better resource utilization. Most of these approaches 
implement a form of social distancing to reduce infection 
exposure, followed by application of pharmaceutical means. 
A number of significant contributions has been made in this 
challenging area.1,25,28–32 One of the most notable among 
the recent efforts is a 2006–07 initiative by the Models of 
Infectious Disease Agent Study (MIDAS)33 which examined 
independent models of large-scale PI spread for rural areas of 
Asia,34,35 U.S. and U.K.,36,37 and the city of Chicago.38 MIDAS 
cross-validated the models by simulating the city of Chicago, 
with 8.6 M inhabitants, and implementing targeted layered 
containment.39,40 The research findings of MIDAS and other 
institutions14,25 were used in a recent “Modeling Community 
Containment for Pandemic Influenza” report by the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM), to   formulate a set of recommendations 
for mitigating PI at a local level.41 These recommendations 
were used in a pandemic preparedness guidance developed 
jointly by CDC, HHS, and other federal agencies.42
At the same time, the IOM report points out several 
limitations of the MIDAS models, observing that “because 
of the significant constraints placed on the models” being 
considered by policy makers, “the scope of the models should 
be expanded.” The IOM recommends “to adapt or develop 
decision-aid models that can ... provide real-time feedback 
during an epidemic.” The report also emphasizes that “future 
modeling efforts should incorporate broader outcome mea-
sures ... to include the costs and benefits of intervention 
strategies”.41 It can indeed be observed that practically all 
existing approaches focus on assessment of apriori defined 
strategies; virtually none of the synergistic decision models 
are capable of “learning”, ie, adapting to changes in the 
pandemic course, yet predicting them, to generate a dynamic 
optimal strategy. Such a strategy is advantageous in its ability 
to be state-dependent, ie, as being formed dynamically as the 
pandemic spreads, by selecting the optimal combination of 
available mitigation options at each decision epoch, based 
on the present pandemic state.
In an attempt to address the IOM recommendations, we 
present two novel simulation-based optimization models 
for developing dynamic predictive resource distribution 
strategies for a network of regional pandemic outbreaks. In 
both models, the underlying simulation mimics disease and 
population dynamics of the affected regions (Sections 2.1 
and 2.2). The quantity-based optimization model (Section 2.3) 
generates a progressive allocation of limited quantities of 
mitigation resources, including stockpiles of vaccines and 
antiviral, healthcare capacities for vaccination and antiviral 
treatment, and social distancing enforcement resources. The 
budget-based optimization model (Section 2.3.1) allocates 
a total resource budget, as opposed to a separate allocation 
of individual resources, which vary in their relative cost and 
effectiveness. Both models seek to dynamically minimize 
the impact of ongoing outbreaks and the expected impact of 
potential outbreaks, spreading from the ongoing regions. The 
optimality criterion incorporates measures of morbidity, mor-
tality, and social distancing, translated into the societal and 
economic costs of lost productivity and medical expenses. Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
67
Resource strategies for mitigation of influenza pandemics
The models were calibrated using historic pandemic data 
and implemented on a sample cross-regional outbreak in 
Florida, U.S., with over four million inhabitants (Section 3). 
We present a sensitivity analysis for estimating the marginal 
impact of changes in the total budget and quantity availability 
(Section 3.4), and show that the quantity-based approach is 
inferior to the budget-based strategy, which takes advantage 
of its ability to balance the relative cost and effectiveness of 
individual resources.
Compared to our earlier work,43 this paper presents the 
following main advances: (i) the original single-region simu-
lation43 has been expanded to serve as the basis for the cross-
regional simulation model presented in this paper; (ii) we now 
propose two novel dynamic optimization models, embedded 
in the cross-regional simulation, to generate resource dis-
tribution strategies; as such, the decision support power of 
our model has substantially increased; (iii) the calibration 
methodology now incorporates both the basic reproduction 
number and the infection attack rate; inclusion of the latter 
adds to a more accurate assessment of the pandemic severity 
over the entirety of the pandemic period, and (iv) our model 
now incorporates certain socio-behavioral features, such as 
the target population compliance.
Simulation-based optimization 
framework
Our simulation-based optimization framework generates pro-
gressive resource allocations over a network of regional out-
breaks. Resources include stockpiles and capacities for vaccine 
and antiviral administration, and social distancing enforcement 
resources, among others. The framework subsumes a cross-
regional simulation model, a set of single-region simulation 
models, and an overarching optimization control.
The regions inside the network are classified as unaffected, 
ongoing outbreak or contained. The cross-regional model 
connects the regions by air and land travel. The single-region 
model emulates the (hourly) population and disease dynam-
ics of each ongoing region, affected by mitigation measures. 
The pandemic spreads from ongoing to unaffected regions 
by (a)symptomatic travelers passing through border control. 
At every new regional outbreak epoch, the optimization 
model allocates available resources to the new outbreak 
region (actual allocation) and unaffected regions (virtual 
allocation). Daily statistics are collected for each region, 
including the number of infected, deceased, and quarantined 
cases, for different age groups. As a regional outbreak is 
contained, its societal and economic costs are estimated.
cross-regional simulation model
The model initializes by creating mixing groups and   population 
dynamics for each region (see Section 2.1). A pandemic is trig-
gered by injecting one infectious case into a randomly chosen 
region. The resulting regional contact dynamics and disease 
propagation are presented in Section 2.2. As the symptomatic 
cases start seeking medical assistance, the new regional out-
break is detected, and a resource allocation is generated (see 
Section 2.3) and passed over to the single-region model.
The outbreak spreads to unaffected regions as infec-
tious travelers pass with some probability through border 
control (the probability varies with the degree of symptom 
manifestation). Travelers are assumed to act independently. 
Each traveler is assumed to seed a regional outbreak in her 
destination with an equal, time-homogeneous probability ω 
for the entirety of her infection period. For each unaffected 
region, the outbreak probability at time t is calculated using 
the binomial probability law, as follows
  P t
nt =− −, 11 () ω   (1)
where nt denotes the number of infectious travelers in the 
region at time t. Based on the outbreak probability values, the 
model determines which of the regions have become new out-
breaks (in the testbed implementation, the values of Pt were 
computed daily). The model also determines if an ongoing 
outbreak has been contained, based on a certain threshold of 
the daily infection rate. The cross-regional simulation stops 
when all outbreaks have been contained.
Single-region simulation model
The single-region simulation model mimics population and 
disease dynamics within the affected region.
A schematic of the model is shown in Figure 1. The model 
subsumes the following main components: (i) population 
dynamics (schedules), (ii) contact and infection process, 
Begin single-region
simulation
Check status of
social distancing
Assign schedules
From 8:00 am-7:59 pm,
implement every ∆ t
Contact process
Infection process
Disease history
Vaccination &
antiviral therapy
From 8:00 pm-7:59 am,
implement every ∆ t
Disease history
Collect statistics
End single-region 
simulation
Figure 1 Schematic of single-region simulation model.Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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(iii) disease natural history, and (iv) mitigation prevention 
and intervention, including social distancing, vaccina-
tion, and antiviral application. The model collects detailed 
regional statistics, including numbers of infected, recovered, 
deceased, and quarantined cases, for different age groups. 
For a contained outbreak, its societal and economic costs are 
calculated. The societal cost includes the cost of lost lifetime 
productivity of the deceased; the economic cost includes 
the cost of medical expenses of the recovered and deceased 
and the cost of lost productivity of the quarantined (see 
Section 3.3; Meltzer 1999).44 The single-region simulation 
extends our original model.43
Population dynamics (schedules)
We view a region as a set of population centers formed by 
mixing groups (eg, households, offices, facilities,   universities, 
  dormitories, schools, shopping centers, etc.). Each individual 
is assigned a set of attributes (eg, age, gender, parenthood, 
workplace, infection susceptibility, probability of travel, etc). 
Each person is also assigned ∆t time-discrete (eg, ∆t = 1 hour) 
weekday and weekend schedules, which depend on: (i) person’s 
age and parenthood, (ii) disease status, (iii) travel status, (iv) 
social distancing decrees in place and person’s compliance. 
As their schedules advance, inhabitants circulate throughout 
the mixing groups. It is assumed that at any point of time, an 
individual belongs to one of the exclusive compartments of 
susceptible, infected, recovered or deceased.
contact and infection processes
Infection transmission occurs during contact events between 
susceptible and infectious cases in the mixing groups. At the 
beginning of every ∆t period (eg, one hour), for each mixing 
group g, the simulation tracks the total number of infectious 
cases, ng, present in the group. Each infectious case gener-
ates rg per ∆t unit of time new contacts,37 chosen randomly 
(uniformly) from the susceptible. We make the following 
assumptions about the contact process: (i) during ∆t period, 
a susceptible may come into contact with at most one infec-
tious case and (ii) each contact exposure lasts ∆t units of 
time. Once a susceptible has started a contact exposure at 
time t, she will develop infection at time t + ∆t with a certain 
probability that is calculated as shown below.
Let Li(t) be a nonnegative continuous random variable 
that represents the duration of contact exposure, starting at 
time t, required for contact i to become infected. We assume 
that Li(t) is distributed exponentially with mean 1/λi(t), where 
λi(t) represents the instantaneous force of infection applied 
to contact i at time t.45–47 The probability that susceptible i, 
whose contact exposure has started at time t, will develop 
infection at time t + ∆t is then given as
  PLtt e i
tt i {( )}
() ≤∆ =− .
−∆ 1
λ
  (2)
Disease natural history
A schematic of the disease natural history is shown in Figure 2. 
During the incubation phase, the individual stays asymp-
tomatic. At the end of the latency phase, she becomes 
infectious and enters the infectious phase.35,37,39 She becomes 
  symptomatic at the end of incubation. At the end of the 
infectious phase, she enters the final disease stage which 
culminates in her recovery or death.
Mortality for influenza is a complex process affected 
by many factors and variables, most of which have limited 
accurate data support from past pandemics. Furthermore, the 
time of death can be weeks following the disease episode 
(often attributable to pneumonia related complications).48 
Because of the uncertainty underlying the mortality process, 
we thus adopted a simplified, age-based form of the mortality 
probability of infected i, as follows
 m i = µi − τρi,  (3)
where µi is the age-dependent base mortality probability of 
infected i, ρi is her status of antiviral therapy (0 or 1), and τ 
is the antiviral efficacy measured as the decrease in the base 
probability.35 We assume that a recovered case develops 
immunity but continues circulating in the mixing groups.
Mitigation strategies
Mitigation include pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
options. It is initiated upon detection of a critical number of 
confirmed infected cases,49 which triggers resource allocation 
and deployment. We assume a certain delay for deployment 
of field responders.
Pharmaceutical mitigation consists of vaccination and 
antiviral application. Vaccination is targeted at individuals 
at risk to reduce their infection susceptibility. We assume 
that a certain fraction of the risk group does not comply 
Latency
Period leading to 
health outcome Infectiousness
Incubation
Becomes 
asymptomatic
Becomes 
symptomatic
Becomes 
infectious
Recovers 
or dies
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with   vaccination. The vaccine takes a certain period to 
become effective (typically, between 10 and 14 days).50 
Vaccination is constrained by the available stockpile and 
administration capacity measured in terms of the number of 
  immunizer-hours.
We assume that as some symptomatic cases seek medical 
assistance,51,52 a fraction at risk of them receives an antiviral. 
Antiviral treatment is subject to availability of the antiviral 
stockpile and administration capacity, measured in terms of 
the number of certified providers.
Both vaccination and antiviral application are affected 
by social behavioral factors, including conformance of the 
target population, degree of risk perception, and compli-
ance of healthcare personnel.53–55 The conformance level of 
the population at risk can be affected, among other factors, 
by the demographics and income level56–60 as well as the 
quality of public information.61 The degree of risk perception 
can be influenced by negative experiences developed during 
pharmaceutical campaigns of the previous outbreaks,62,63 as 
well as by public fear and rumors.64,65
Non-pharmaceutical mitigation includes social distanc-
ing and travel restrictions. We adopted a CDC guidance,42 
which establishes five categories of pandemic severity and 
recommends quarantine and closure options according to the 
category. The categories are determined based on the value 
of the case fatality ratio (CFR), the proportion of fatalities in 
the total infected population. For the CFR lower than 0.1% 
(Category 1), voluntary at-home isolation of infected cases 
is implemented. If the CFR falls in-between 0.1% and 1.0% 
(Categories 2 and 3), in addition to the at-home isolation, 
the following measures are recommended: (i) voluntary 
quarantine of households members of infected cases and 
(ii) child and adult social distancing. For the CFR exceed-
ing 1.0% (Categories 4 and 5), all the above measures are 
implemented. As effectiveness of social distancing is affected 
by some of the behavioral factors listed above,61 we assume 
a certain social distancing conformance level. Travel restric-
tions considered in the model included regional air and land 
border control for infected travelers.
Optimization models
The optimization model (budget-based or resource-based) is 
invoked at the beginning of every nth new regional outbreak 
epoch (n = 1,2,…), starting from the initial outbreak region 
(n = 1). The objective of the model is to allocate some of the 
available mitigation resources to the new outbreak region 
(actual allocation) while reserving the rest of the resources 
for potential outbreak regions (virtual allocation). By doing 
so, the model seeks to progressively minimize the impact 
of ongoing outbreaks and the expected impact of potential 
outbreaks, spreading from the ongoing locations. Mitigation 
resources can include stockpiles of vaccine and antiviral, 
administration capacities for their administration, hospital 
beds, medical supplies, and social distancing enforcement 
resources, among others. The   predictive mechanism of the 
optimization model is based on a set of regression equations 
obtained using   single-region simulation models. In what 
  follows, we present the   construction of the optimization 
model and explain the solution algorithm for the overall 
simulation-based optimization methodology (Section 2.4).
We introduce the following general notation.
S = set of all network regions,
An =   set of regions in which pandemic is contained at the 
nth outbreak epoch (n = 1,2,…),
Bn = set of ongoing regions at the nth outbreak epoch,
Cn = set of unaffected regions at the nth outbreak epoch,
R =   set of available types of mitigation resources 
(R = {1,2,…,r}),
ci = unit cost of type i resource, i ∈ R,
qik = amount of resource i allocated to region k,
Q
n
i  =   available amount of resource i ∈ R at the nth outbreak 
epoch,
Mn = budget availability at the nth outbreak epoch,
H = set of age groups.
In both models, the optimization criterion (objective 
  function) incorporates measures of societal and economic 
costs of the pandemic: the societal cost includes the cost of 
lost lifetime productivity of the deceased; the economic cost 
includes the cost of medical expenses of the recovered and 
deceased and the cost of lost productivity of the quarantined. 
To compute these costs, the following impact measures of mor-
bidity, mortality, and quarantine are used, for each region k:
Xhk =   total number of infected cases in age group h who 
seek medical assistance,
Yhk =   total number of infected cases in age group h who 
do not seek medical assistance,
Dhk =   total number of deceased cases in age group h,
Vhk =   total number of person-days of cases in age group 
h who comply with quarantine.
We use the following regression models, obtained using 
a single-region simulation of each region k, to estimate the 
above impact measures of morbidity, mortality, and social dis-
tancing (dependent variables) as a function of the   independent 
variables (resource allocation):
Xq qq hk hk hk
i
ik
iR
hk
im
ik mk
im Ri m
=+ ⋅+ ⋅⋅
∈∈ ≠ ∑∑ δδ δ
0
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where δ  i.. denotes the regression coefficient associated with 
resource i, and δ  im .. is the regression coefficient for the inter-
action between resources i and m. Similar expressions are 
used for Yhk, Dhk, and Vhk. The quadratic form of the regres-
sion equations is adopted, as opposed to the linear, to better 
capture the interaction between the variables (eg, vaccine 
stockpile and administration capacity).
The above relationships between the impact measures 
and the resource allocations ought to be determined 
apriori of implementing a cross-regional scenario (see 
Section 3). Here, we consider each region k as the initial 
outbreak region so that the values of Xhk, Yhk, Dhk, and 
Vhk are estimated for the entire pandemic period. We 
assume, however, that as the pandemic evolves, the disease 
infectivity will naturally subside. Hence, we incorporate 
a decay factor α n66 to adjust the estimates of the regional 
impact measures at every nth outbreak epoch, in the 
following way:
 
XX YY DD
VV
hj
nn
hj hj
nn
hj hj
nn
hj
hj
nn
hj
===
=
ααα
α
,, ,
.
  (4)
Alternatively, the regression equations can be re-estimated 
at every new outbreak epoch, for each region k ∈ Cn, using 
the single-region simulation models, where each simulation 
must be initialized to the current outbreak status in region 
k in the cross-regional simulation.
In addition, we use the following regression model 
to estimate the probability of pandemic spread from 
affected region l to unaffected region k, as a function of 
resources allocated to region l, which, in turn, impact 
the number of outgoing infectious travelers from the 
region:
 
pq qq
lk lk lk
i
il
iR
lk
im
il
imR
im
ml =+ ⋅+ ⋅⋅
∈∈
≠
∑∑ γγ γ
0
,
,
 
where γ   i
.. denotes the regression coefficient associated with 
resource i, γ   im
.. is the regression coefficient associated with 
interaction between resources i and m, and γ  0
.. represents 
the intercept. Consequently, the total outbreak probability 
for unaffected region k can be found as  p p k
lB
lk
n
=
∈ ∑ . We 
use a scheme similar to Eq. 4 to progressively adjust the 
estimates of the regional outbreak probabilities
  pp k
nn
k =. α   (5)
Finally, we calculate the total cost of an outbreak in region 
k at the nth decision epoch as follows
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(6)
where
mh =   total medical cost of an infected case in age group 
h over his/her disease period,
w –
h =   total cost of lost wages of an infected case in age 
group h over his/her disease period,
w ˆ
h =   cost of lost lifetime wages of a deceased case in 
age group h,
wh =   daily cost of lost wages of a non-infected case in age 
group h who complies with quarantine.
Quantity-based and budget-based  
optimization models
The quantity-based and budget-based optimization models 
have the following form.
Both models have the same objective function. The first 
term of the objective function represents the total cost of the 
new outbreak j, estimated at the nth outbreak epoch, based on 
the actual resource allocation {q1j,q2j, … qrj} (see Eq. 6). The 
second term represents the total expected cost of outbreaks in 
currently unaffected regions, based on the virtual allocations 
{q1s, q2s, …, qrs} and the regional outbreak probabilities pn
s 
(Eq. 5).
In the quantity-based model, the set of constraints 
assures that for each resource i, the total quantity allocated 
(current and virtual, both nonnegative) does not exceed 
the total resource availability at the nth decision epoch. 
Minimize TC qq qT C
qq qp
j
n
jj rj sC s
n
ss rs s
n
n ()
()
12
12
,, ,+
,, ,⋅
∈ ∑ …
…
  Quantity-based model 
  subject to 
  qq pQ iR ij sC is s
n
i
n
n +⋅ ≤∀ ∈,
∈ ∑  
 
qq iR ij is ,≥∀∈. 0
 
  Budget-based model 
  subject to 
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Both the objective function and the availability constraints 
are nonlinear in the decision variables.
In the budget-based model, the first constraint relates the 
total available budget at nth decision epoch with the total cost 
of the resources to be allocated (current and virtual). The 
second constraint assures a nonnegative allocation.
Solution algorithm
The solution algorithm for our dynamic predictive simulation 
optimization methodology is given below.
  1.  Estimate regression equations for each region using the 
single-region simulation model.
  2.  Begin the cross-regional simulation model.
  3.  Initialize the sets of regions: An = φ, Bn = φ, Cn = S
  4.  Select randomly the initial outbreak region j. Set 
n = 1.
  5.  Update sets of regions: Bn ← Bn ∪ { j} and Cn ←   
Cn\{ j}.
  6.  Solve the resource allocation model (budget or quantity) 
for region j. Update the total resource availabilities.
  7.  If Bn ≠ φ, do step 8. Else, do step 10.
  8.  (a)     For each ongoing region, implement a next day run 
of its single-region simulation.
(b)     Check the containment status of each ongoing 
region. Update sets An and Bn, if needed.
(c)      For each unaffected region, calculate its outbreak 
probability.
(d)     Based on the outbreak probability values, determine 
if there is a new outbreak region(s) j.
    If there is no new outbreak(s), go to step 7. Other-
wise, go to step 9.
  9.  For each new outbreak region j,
(a)   Increment n ← n + 1.
(b)   Update sets Bn ← Bn ∪ { j} and Cn ← Cn\{ j}.
(c)     Re-estimate regression equations for each region 
k ∈ Bn ∪ Cn using the single-region simulations, 
where each simulation is initialized to the current 
outbreak status in the region (optional step; alter-
natively, use Eq. 4 and Eq. 5).
(d)     Solve the resource allocation model (budget or 
quantity) for region j.
(e)   Update the total resource availabilities.
10.  Calculate the total cost for each contained region and 
update the overall pandemic cost.
Testbed
A testbed scenario included a network of four counties in 
Florida: Hillsborough, Miami Dade, Duval, and Leon, with 
population of 1.0, 2.2, 0.8, and 0.25 million people, respec-
tively. The H5N1 virus was considered. A basic unit of time 
∆t for population and disease dynamics models was taken as 
one hour. Regional simulations were run for a period (up to 
180 days) until the daily infection rate approached near zero 
(see Section 3). Below we present the details on selecting 
parameter values for our models. Most of the testbed data 
can be found in the supplement.67
Parameter values for population  
and disease dynamics models
Demographic and social dynamics data for each region were 
extracted from the U.S. Census68 and the National Household 
Travel Survey.69 Daily (hourly) schedules were adopted from 
Das and Savachkin, 2008.43
Each infected person was assigned a daily travel 
probability of 0.24%,69 of which 7% was by air and 93% 
by land. The probabilities of travel among the four regions 
were calculated using traffic volume data (Table 1).70–73 
Infection detection probabilities for border control for 
symptomatic cases were assumed to be 95% and 90%, for 
air and land, respectively. These values were reduced by 70% 
for asymptomatic cases. The value of ω in Eq. 1 was taken as 
0.01. The values of regional outbreak probabilities Pt were 
calculated once at the end of every day.
The instantaneous force of infection applied to contact i 
at time t (Eq. 2) was modeled as
 λ i(t) = −ln(1−pi(t)), where pi(t) = αi − δθi(t)  (7)
where αi is the age-dependent base instantaneous infection 
probability of contact i, θi(t), is her status of vaccination at 
time t (0 or 1), and δ is the vaccine efficacy, measured as 
the reduction in the base instantaneous infection probability 
(achieved after 10 days).50
The values of age-dependent base instantaneous 
infection probabilities were adopted from Germann, 
200637 (see Table 2). The disease natural history for H5N1 
Table 1 inter-regional travel probabilities
Origin/destination Inter-regional travel probability
Hillsborough Miami D Duval Leon
Hillsborough 0.00 0.60 0.27 0.13
Miami D 0.74 0.00 0.16 0.10
Duval 0.61 0.29 0.00 0.10
Leon 0.52 0.31 0.17 0.00Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
Dovepress 
Dovepress
72
Uribe-Sánchez and Savachkin
virus included a latent period of 29 hours, an incubation 
period of 46 hours, and an infectiousness period between 
29 and 127 hours.74
Base mortality probabilities (µi in Eq. 3) were determined 
using the statistics recommended by the Working Group on 
Pandemic Preparedness and Influenza Response.44 This data 
shows the percentage of mortality for age-based high-risk 
cases (HRC) (Table 3, columns 1–3). Mortality probabilities 
(column 4) were estimated under the assumption that high-
risk cases are expected to account for of the total number of 
fatalities, for each age group.44
calibration of the single-region models
Single-region simulation models were calibrated using the 
basic reproduction number (R0) and the infection attack rate 
(IAR). R0 is defined as the average number of secondary 
infections produced by a typical infected case in a totally 
susceptible population. IAR is defined as the ratio of the 
total number of infections over the pandemic period to the 
size of the initial susceptible population. To determine R0, 
all infected cases inside the simulation were classified by 
generation of infection.25,34 The value of R0 was calculated 
as the average reproduction number of a typical generation 
in the early stage of the pandemic, with no interventions 
implemented (baseline scenario).25 Historically, R0 values 
for PI ranged between 1.4 and 3.9.29,34 To attain similar 
values, we calibrated the hourly contact rates of mixing 
groups (original rates were adopted from).37 For the four 
regions, the average value of R0 was 2.54, which represented 
a high transmissibility scenario. The values of regional IAR 
averaged 0.538.
Mitigation related parameters
Mitigation resources included stocks of vaccines and anti-
viral, capacities for vaccination and antiviral application, 
and quarantine enforcement resources (required to achieve a 
target conformance level). We assumed a 24-hour deployment 
delay following detection of the first infection case.49
The vaccination risk group included individuals younger 
than 5 years and older than 65 years.75 The risk group for 
antiviral included individuals below 15 years and above 
55 years.75,76 The efficacy levels for the vaccine (δ in Eq. 7) 
and antiviral (τ in Eq. 3) were assumed to be 40%35,77 and 
30%, respectively. We assumed a 95% target population 
conformance for both measures. The immunity development 
period for the vaccine was taken as 10 days.50
A version of the CDC guidance for quarantine and isola-
tion for Category 5 was implemented (see Section 4). Once 
the CFR has reached 1.0%, the following policy was declared 
and remained in effect for 14 days:42 (i) individuals below a 
prespecified age ξ (22 years) stayed at home during the entire 
policy duration; (ii) of the remaining population, a certain 
proportion φ stayed at home and was allowed a one-hour 
leave, every three days, to buy essential supplies;78 (iii) the 
remaining (1−φ) non-compliant proportion followed a regular 
schedule. All testbed scenarios considered the quarantine 
conformance level φ (a decision variable) bounded between 
50% and 80%.61
An outbreak was considered contained if the daily infec-
tion rate did not exceed five cases, for seven consecutive days. 
Once contained, a region was simulated for an additional 
10 days for accurate estimation of the pandemic statistics. 
A 25 statistical design of experiment was used to estimate 
the regression coefficient values of the significant decision 
factors and their interactions (Section 2.3).
The simulation code was developed using C++. The 
running time for a cross-regional simulation replicate aver-
aged 19 minutes on a Pentium 3.40 GHz PC with 4.0 GB 
of RAM.
comparison of two allocation models: 
sensitivity analysis
This section presents a performance comparison of the 
quantity-based and budget-based allocation models. We 
also present a sensitivity analysis for assessing the marginal 
impact of changes in the total resource availability. The mar-
ginal impact is measured by the change in the total pandemic 
cost (averaged over multiple replicates), resulting from a unit 
change in the total quantity/budget availability.
Table 4 summarizes vaccination and antiviral treatment 
resource requirements for each region, based on the composi-
tion of the risk groups (see Section 3). The table also shows 
the resource costs,79–81 budget requirement by each resource, 
and the total required budget.
Table 2 instantaneous infection probabilities
Age group 0–5 6–19 20–29 31–65 66–99
αi 0.156 0.106 0.205 0.195 0.344
Table 3 Mortality probabilities for different age groups
Age group % High-risk cases % Mortality in 
high-risk cases
μi
0–19 6.4 9.0 0.007
20–64 14.4 40.9 0.069
65+ 40.0 34.4 0.162Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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Table 5 shows the costs of lost productivity and   medical 
expenses adopted from Meltzer, 199944 and adjusted for 
inflation for the year of 2010.82
Comparison of the two allocation models was done at 
different levels of the total resource availability relative to 
the total requirement. The total resource quantity require-
ments are shown in Table 4 along with the corresponding 
required budget. The sensitivity analysis was performed for 
quantity levels of 80%, 65%, 50%, 35%, and 20% of the total 
quantity requirement, for each resource. The corresponding 
budget values were computed using resource unit costs from 
Table 4.
Figures 3a and 3b below show the dynamics of the 
average number of infected cases and the average number of 
fatalities for different levels of resource availability. Figure 4 
shows the corresponding dynamics for the average total 
pandemic cost. For illustrative purposes, we also show the 
average number of regional outbreaks, for both allocation 
models, in the testbed scenario involving four regions, with 
Hillsborough as the initial outbreak region (Table 6).
Table 4 regional resource and budget requirements
Region 
(population)
Resource requirements by region Cost of 
resource
Required 
budget Hillsb 
(1,007,916)
Miami D 
(2,209,702)
Duval 
(852,168)
Leon 
(248,761)
Total 
(4,318,547)
Resource
Vaccine stock 305,036 679,181 241,522 76,007 1,301,745 $8.48/dose $11.038 M
Antiviral stock 415,294 749,058 460,393 105,307 1,730,052 $60/dose $103.803 M
no. antiv. nurses 650 1,104 786 166 2,706 $27/hr 8 hr/day, 50 days $29.226 M
no. vacc. nurses 1,059 2,358 839 264 4,520 $27/hr 8 hr/day, 14 days $13.668 M
Total budget requirement $157.737 M
Table  5  Values  of  pandemic  impact  measures  (societal  and 
economic costs)
Pandemic impact measure  
(age group, years)
Value US$
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity  
of a deceased case (0–19)
$1,336,347.86
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity  
of a deceased case (20–64)
$1,370,987.28
Average cost of lost lifetime productivity  
of a deceased case (65–99)
$98,959.24
Average cost of lost productivity and medical  
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (0–19)
$5,078.48
Average cost of lost productivity and medical  
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (20–64)
$10,466.68
Average cost of lost productivity and medical  
expenses of a recovered/deceased case (65–99)
$11,566.09
Average daily cost of lost productivity  
of a non-infected quarantined case (20–99)
$432.54
As expected, the curves for all impact measures   (average 
total number of infected, deaths, and total cost) exhibit a 
downward trend, for both allocation models, as the total 
resource availability increases. Increased total resource avail-
ability not only mediates a regional pandemic impact but 
also reduces the probability of spread to unaffected regions. 
For both models, as the resource availability approaches the 
resource requirement (starting from approximately 60%), 
the impact curves show a converging behavior, whereby the 
marginal utility of additional resource availability dimin-
ishes. This can be explained by noting that the total resource 
requirement was determined assuming the worst case sce-
nario when all regions would be affected and provided with 
adequate resources to cover their respective populations at 
risk. It can also be observed that for all three measures, the 
budget-based model dominates the quantity-based model at 
all levels of resource availability. This can be attributed to the 
fact that the budget-based model, being less restrictive as 
having only one constraint (Section 1), also takes advantage 
of its ability to balance the relative cost and effectiveness 
of individual resources, such as vaccine, antiviral, etc. The 
difference in the performance of two models was as high 
as 339,079 infected cases, 19,724 fatalities, and 17.84 M in 
the pandemic cost (all attained at the 20% resource avail-
ability). The difference in policy performance gradually 
diminishes as the resource availability increases and as 
available quantities become close to be sufficient to cover the 
entire populations at risk in all regions: at 80% availability, 
the gap was 118,124 infected, 4,318 fatalities, and 5.07M 
in the pandemic cost.
Conclusions
Effective mitigation of influenza pandemics has to invari-
ably rely on understanding of evolution of disease and 
population dynamics and intelligent resource allocation. As 
recently pointed by the IOM, the existing models fall short 
of providing dynamic decision support, which incorporates 
broader outcome measures including “costs and benefits Journal of Multidisciplinary Healthcare 2010:3 submit your manuscript | www.dovepress.com
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of intervention”. In this paper, we present two large-scale 
simulation-based optimization models specifically aimed at 
addressing these challenges.
The models support development of dynamic predictive 
resource allocation strategies for a network of regional out-
breaks. In both models, the underlying simulation mimics the 
disease and population dynamics of the affected regions. The 
quantity-based optimization model generates a progressive 
allocation of resource quantities, whereas the budget-based 
model aims at allocating the total resource budget. Both 
models seek to minimize the impact of ongoing and expected 
outbreaks. The impact measures incorporate morbidity, mor-
tality, and social distancing, translated into the societal and 
economic costs of lost productivity and medical expenses. 
The models were calibrated using historic pandemic data and 
implemented on a sample cross-regional outbreak in Florida, 
with over 4M inhabitants.
Summary of the main results. We observed that for both 
models, the marginal utility of additional resource   availability 
was steadily diminishing as the resource availability 
approached the resource requirement for a worst case sce-
nario, in which all regions would be affected. We also showed 
that the quantity-based model was inferior to the budget-
based model at different levels of resource availability. While 
the budget-based model includes the quantity-based solution 
as a special case, the former takes advantage of its inherent 
ability to balance the different relative cost and effectiveness 
of individual resources. Moreover, the budget-based model is 
less restrictive (the only constraint is the total available budget), 
and therefore, it has a richer geometry of feasible solutions at 
any decision epoch of pandemic evolution. The difference in 
model performance was particularly noticeable at lower levels 
of resource availability, which is in accordance with a higher 
marginal utility of additional availability at that levels. Hence, 
the budget-based model can be most useful in scenarios with 
very limited supply of resources.
Contributions of the model. The methodology presented in 
this paper is one of the first attempts to offer dynamic predictive 
decision support for pandemic mitigation, which incorporates 
measures of societal and economic impact. Our comparison 
study of the budget-based versus quantity-based progressive 
cross-regional resource allocations is also novel. In addition, 
our simulation model represents one of the first of its kind 
in considering a broader range of social behavioral aspects, 
including vaccination and antiviral treatment conformance. The 
simulation features a flexible design which can be particularized 
to a broader range of pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical 
interventions and more granular mixing groups.
Based on our methodology, we have also developed a 
decision-aid simulator with a GUI which is made freely 
available to general public through our web site at http://
imse.eng.usf.edu/pandemics.aspx. The simulator allows the 
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Figure 3 Sensitivity analysis on total resource availability (measured in terms of the average number of infected (a) and the average number of deaths (b)).
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input of data for regional demographic and social dynamics, 
and disease related parameters. It is intended to assist public 
health decision makers in conducting customized what-if 
analysis for assessment of mitigation options and develop-
ment of policy guidelines. Examples of such guidelines 
include targeted risk groups for vaccination and antiviral 
treatment, social distancing policies (eg, thresholds for dec-
laration and lifting, closure options (ie, household-based, 
schools, etc.), and compliance targets), and guidelines for 
travel restrictions.
Limitations of the model. Lack of reliable data prevented 
us from considering geo-spatial aspects of mixing group 
formation in the testbed implementation. We also did not 
consider the impact of public education and use of personal 
protective measures (eg, face masks) on transmission, again 
due to a lack of effectiveness data.83 We did not study the 
marginal effectiveness of individual resources due to a con-
siderable uncertainty about the transmissibility of a future 
pandemic virus and efficacy of vaccine and antiviral. For the 
same reason, the vaccine and antiviral risk groups consid-
ered in the testbed can be adjusted, as different prioritization 
schemes have been suggested in the literature, based on 
predicted characteristics of a future virus. The form of social 
distancing implemented in the testbed can also be modi-
fied as a variety of schemes can be found in the literature, 
including geographical and social targeting. Effectiveness 
of these approaches is substantially influenced by the policy 
compliance, for which limited accurate data support exists. 
It will thus be vital to gather the most detailed data on the 
epidemiology of a new virus and the population dynamics 
early in the evolution of a pandemic, and to expeditiously 
analyze it to adjust the interventions accordingly.
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